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Children Are Our Future:  
Resurrecting Juvenile Rehabilitation 
Through “Raise the Age” Legislation in 
Missouri 
Brittany L. Briggs* 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
On Monday, October 29, 2018, retired St. Louis Police Sergeant Ralph 
Harper was murdered during a botched robbery.1  Two juveniles, ages fifteen 
and sixteen, were accused of carrying out the attempted robbery gone wrong.2  
Because of their ages, they were charged in juvenile court, where punishments 
are more individualized and sentences are generally less harsh than adults 
would receive.3  To determine if the boys would be subject to the adult 
criminal system, they were granted a transfer hearing where a juvenile court 
judge determined whether the nature of the accused crime and the juveniles’ 
individual characteristics would be better addressed by the adult criminal 
justice system.4   
At the transfer hearing, the two juveniles made their cases about why 
they belonged in the juvenile system.5  For a crime he committed at age 
fifteen, one juvenile was charged as an adult with second degree murder, 
 
* B.A., University of Missouri-Columbia, 2017; J.D. Candidate, University of 
Missouri School of Law, 2020; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2019–2020.  
A special thanks to Professor Douglas Abrams for his guidance and to the editorial 
staff of the Missouri Law Review for their insightful edits.  
 1. Christine Byers, Boys, 15 and 16, Charged in Juvenile Court with Murder of 




 2. Id.   
 3. Id.   
 4. Joel Currier, Second Teen Charged With Murder of Retired St. Louis Police 
Sergeant, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 14, 2019), https://www.stltoday.com/news/ 
local/crime-and-courts/second-teen-charged-with-murder-of-retired-st-louis-police/a 
rticle_0d4aee19-3a35-59ee-b3d6-0f3173f7bfff.html [perma.cc/7SPE-BB6Y]. 
 5. Id.  
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armed criminal action, attempted robbery, tampering, and resisting arrest.6  He 
eventually pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a twenty-year suspended 
sentence in a dual jurisdiction juvenile program.7  If the juvenile successfully 
completes juvenile programming, including counseling and vocational 
training, he could be released on probation when he is twenty-one years old.8  
The other juvenile who participated in Sergeant Harper’s death also received 
juvenile detention for his role.9  Ironically, one of the boys’ seventeen-year-
old brother, Julian Mathews, charged with a lesser crime unrelated to the 
murder, did not receive the same chance.  
Julian was arrested on the same day as the boys but was not involved in 
the attempted robbery or murder.10  He was charged with two misdemeanors 
upon his arrest.11  Because Julian was seventeen years old when he was 
arrested, he was charged as an adult.12  Weeks before Sergeant Harper’s death, 
Julian had been arrested and charged with two felonies: felony possession of 
marijuana and unlawful possession of a weapon.13  Unlike his brother, he will 
not receive the many benefits of juvenile court.  If convicted, he will carry a 
felony criminal record and its collateral consequences with him for the rest of 
his life.  His younger brother, however, could avoid those negative 
consequences in the juvenile system. 
The difference between Julian and his brother’s cases demonstrates how 
significant a year can be to a juvenile facing the criminal system.  Soon, 
seventeen-year-old juveniles such as Julian will be eligible to receive the 
benefits of Missouri’s juvenile system.  In recent years, state legislatures 
across the country have made it harder to try juveniles in adult courts in a 
legislative movement known as “Raise the Age.”14  Generally, Raise the Age 
 
 6. Erin Heffernan, Teen Charged With Murder of Retired St. Louis Police 
Sergeant to be Tried as an Adult, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (June 11, 2019), 
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/crime-and-courts/teen-charged-with-murder-
of-retired-st-louis-police-sergeant/article_26f22109-7c05-5b1f-b67e-
07d4ca205f04.html [perma.cc/58KY-NYTS].  
 7. Teen Sentenced to Juvenile Detention for Role in Death of Retired St. Louis 
Police Sergeant, KMOV4 (Dec. 12, 2019), https://www.kmov.com/news/teen-
sentenced-to-juvenile-detention-for-role-in-death-of/article_6904b7d8-1d2b-11ea-
947e-83dd1f25e356.html [perma.cc/9KWN-V5VV].  
 8. Id.  
 9. Joel Currier, Teen Sentenced to Juvenile Detention in Killing of Retired St. 




 10. Byers, supra note 1. 
 11. Second degree tampering with a motor vehicle and resisting arrest. State v. 
Mathews, Case No. 1822-CR03756 (St. Louis City Cir. Ct. Oct. 30, 2018). 
 12. Hefferman, supra note 6.  
 13. Id.   
 14. Brian Evans, ‘Raise the Age’ Passage Sets Missouri on Path to Re-Establish 
Itself as Youth Justice Model, SPRINGFIELD NEWS-LEADER (May 26, 2018), 
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legislation represents an evolution in thinking about juvenile justice.  In 2018, 
Missouri’s General Assembly joined the “Raise the Age” movement by 
passing Senate Bill 793.15  On June 1, 2018, former Missouri Governor Eric 
Greitens signed Senate Bill 793 into law, which will raise the age of criminal 
adult prosecution from seventeen to eighteen.16  Missouri joins forty-five 
other states and the District of Columbia that have passed similar “Raise the 
Age” bills in recent years.17  Senate Bill 793 will not go into effect until 
January 1, 2021, but when it does, seventeen-year-old juveniles who violate 
the law will automatically be processed in Missouri’s juvenile courts.18  This 
bill is good news both for the state of Missouri and its juveniles; it will shield 
some juveniles from the adult criminal justice system and its often-irreparable 
consequences while also lowering costs and recidivism rates for Missouri.  
This Note examines the effects of Senate Bill 793 on Missouri and its 
juveniles through the lens of historic shifts in the understanding of juvenile 
justice.  Part II of this Note reviews the historical background leading to the 
creation of separate juvenile justice systems and the history of Missouri’s 
juvenile justice system.  Part III explores how the law has evolved as our 
understanding of juveniles has evolved.  Section A gives a brief history of 
“Raise the Age” statutes across the United States.  Section B details how the 
United States Supreme Court decided to “raise the age” for the harshest types 
of punishment: the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole.  
Part IV is an in-depth look at Missouri Senate Bill 793 and addresses the two-
fold benefit of the change by first explaining why Senate Bill 793 is good for 
Missouri’s juveniles, then discussing why the legislation is also good for 
Missouri’s communities.  Finally, Part IV analyzes possible future reforms to 
make Missouri’s juvenile system better and Missouri’s juveniles safer.  
II.  CHARTING THE PATH TO THE MODERN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
The path to legal adulthood is incremental.  In Missouri, the age of 




 15. Id.  
 16. See S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018); see also Kurt 
Erickson, Here Are the Bills Gov. Eric Greitens Signed Before Leaving Office, ST. 
LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, (June 1, 2018) https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-
and-politics/here-are-the-bills-gov-eric-greitens-signed-before-leaving/article_d2132 
b21-8db0-5d50-bed6-1d8ad4ec34b0.html [perma.cc/NRX5-YKWW].  The Governor 
also signed Senate Bill 800 that same day, which contains identical “Raise the Age” 
language as Senate Bill 793. S.B. 800, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018).  
 17. Evans, supra note 14.  
 18. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018). 
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eighteen, with few exceptions.19  Such exceptions include the age a person 
may drive, get married, give sexual consent, and purchase and consume 
tobacco products and alcohol.  An individual may drive a car and get married 
with parental consent at sixteen.20  A seventeen-year-old Missourian may 
consent to engage in sexual activities.21  In some Missouri jurisdictions, 
individuals may not buy tobacco products until they are twenty-one.22  
Further, individuals may not purchase, possess, or consume alcohol until they 
are twenty-one years old.23   
By law, children are not mature enough to engage in many of the above 
activities.  However, in some instances the state still imposes criminal liability 
on children.  Children as young as twelve can be certified, tried, and sentenced 
as adults in the Missouri criminal justice system.24  There is a tension between 
imposing adult criminal liability on children by virtue of their actions while 
simultaneously barring them because of their youth from driving, marrying, 
voting, smoking, drinking alcohol, or making independent medical decisions.  
The Section that follows aims to put this dichotomy in context by presenting 
a brief history of the juvenile justice system, its goals, and its justifications.  
Next, Section B offers an overview of the structure of Missouri’s juvenile 
justice system and briefly explores why it is a model for other systems across 
the United States. 
A.  Children Are Not Criminals: An Overview of the Juvenile Justice 
System 
Between 1968 and 1972, the United States saw a downward trend for the 
age of majority from twenty-one to eighteen.25  In response, individuals began 
calling for a change in the way society dealt with children in the criminal 
 
 19. See Bushell v. Scheep, 613 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding 
the age of majority is attained at eighteen for most purposes).  
 20. See MO. REV. STAT. § 302.178(1) (2018) (setting the age to obtain a driver’s 
license at sixteen); MO. REV. STAT. § 451.090 (2018) (setting the age of marriage to 
sixteen with parental consent).  In the last legislative session, Missouri passed Senate 
Bill 655, which raised the age of marriage with parental consent from fifteen to sixteen 
and prohibited the marriage of any person over the age of twenty-one to any person 
under the age of eighteen. Michelle Madaras, New Law Cracks Down on Legal Age to 
Marry in Missouri, FOX2NOW (Aug. 27, 2018), https://fox2now.com/2018/08/27/new 
-law-cracks-down-on-legal-age-to-marry-in-missouri/ [perma.cc/4CY6-LUPG]. 
 21. MO. REV. STAT.  § 566.034 (2018) (stating seventeen-year old individuals can 
consent to sexual contact with those twenty-one years or older). 
 22. See, e.g., COLUMBIA, MO., CODE ch. 11, art. X, § 11-316 (2019) (stating 
tobacco products cannot be sold to persons under the age of twenty-one). 
 23. MO. REV. STAT. § 311.310 (2018) (stating businesses are prohibiting from 
selling alcohol to individuals under the age of twenty-one).  
 24. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071 (2018). 
 25. See generally Vivian E. Hamilton, Adulthood in Law and Culture, 91 TUL. L. 
REV. 55 (2016) (outlining the historical trend of the age of majority). 
4
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sphere.26  Prior to the creation of juvenile courts, children accused of crimes 
were given harsh sentences and confined in adult prisons where conditions 
were grim.27  Children were often viewed as miniature adults without 
distinctive emotional and cognitive abilities.28  
Throughout the nineteenth century, “child-savers” advocated for the 
creation of separate juvenile courts.29  From the late-nineteenth century until 
the eve of World War I, Progressive-Era reformers argued children were not 
similar to adults and should not be treated as such.30  They argued poor 
environments, rather than intentional behavior by juveniles, were contributing 
to cases of delinquency.31  They began to push reforms that addressed the 
harsh confinement conditions many child offenders faced.  Such reforms 
included curfew laws designed to keep juveniles inside and out of trouble 
during the nighttime hours.32  Single mothers were offered government-
subsidized stipends that allowed them to stay home with their children 
because many feared sending single mothers to work would push young, poor, 
and unsupervised children into lives of crime.33   
These reforms were coupled with the creation of an entirely separate 
juvenile justice court system.  In 1899, Cook County, Illinois enacted the first 
separate juvenile justice court in the United States.34  By 1925, nearly every 
state maintained a juvenile court that, unlike the adult criminal justice system 
that focused on punishment and confinement, focused on rehabilitation for 
juvenile offenders.35  These new courts gave children an alternative means of 
adjudication outside the adult criminal system.  Juvenile courts also provided 
treatments outside of mere confinement that focused on the needs of “abused, 
neglected, delinquent, and dependent children.”36 
 
 26. DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, SUSAN V. MANGOLD, AND SARAH H. RAMSEY, 
CHILDREN AND THE LAW: DOCTRINE, POLICY, AND PRACTICE 932–46 (6th ed. 2017); 
see also Hamilton, supra note 25, at 64–65; Megan E. Hay, Incremental 
Independence: Conforming the Law to the Process of Adolescence, 15 WM. & MARY 
J. WOMEN & L. 663, 667 (2009) (discussing the legal effects of the age of majority).  
 27. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 934; Douglas E. Abrams, Lessons From 
Juvenile Justice History in the United States, J. INST. JUST. INT’L STUD. 7, 8 (2004). 
 28. Abrams, supra note 27, at 8–9.  
 29. Id.  
 30. Jennifer M. O’Connor & Lucinda K. Treat, Getting Smart About Getting 
Tough: Juvenile Justice and the Possibility of Progressive Reform, 33 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 1299, 1302–03 (1996). 
 31. Id. at 1303.  
 32. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 934. 
 33. Id.  These reforms were not without their flaws; they carried with them 
problematic racial and socioeconomic stereotypes. See generally Cheryl Nelson 
Butler, Blackness as Delinquency, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1335 (2013). 
 34. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 940. 
 35. Id. at 934.  
 36. Alicia N. Harden, Rethinking the Shame: The Intersection of Shaming 
Punishments and American Juvenile Justice, 16 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 93, 100 
(2012).  
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These new juvenile courts were put to the test almost immediately.  The 
Great Depression struck the United States in 1929, and as a result, delinquency 
rates rose as many children had to choose between attending school or 
working to provide for their families.37  Some children resorted to theft to 
avoid hunger.  Juvenile delinquents from this era were some of the first to be 
tried under the new paradigm guiding the juvenile courts: rehabilitation and 
prevention over confinement and punishment.  
1.  Early Juvenile Courts and the Rehabilitative Model 
Early juvenile justice courts had jurisdiction over four categories 
concerning juveniles: abuse and neglect, adoption, status offenses, and 
delinquency.38  Early juvenile courts were also courts of civil jurisdiction 
meant to temper punishment with mercy by shielding juveniles from the 
harshness of the criminal system.39  These courts sought to address the 
misbehavior of juveniles by taking measures meant to rehabilitate them and 
prevent them from committing future crimes.40  The rehabilitative model of 
these courts was future-looking.  It took the juvenile’s age and culpability into 
account and addressed the child’s delinquency through programs and methods 
that sought to prevent re-offending.41  The state, through the early juvenile 
courts, sought “to replicate the environment that the child would enjoy in a 
family setting.”42  In these courts, the judge was meant to sit as a fatherly 
figure who dispensed justice with a focus on the juvenile’s individual needs 
as a devoted parent would.43  This concept, known as parens patriae, focused 
on the best interests of juveniles and the protection of society.44  To achieve 
these goals, early juvenile justice courts had five distinguishing features from 
ordinary criminal courts.  These features were individualized treatment and 
 
 37. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 932–46. 
 38. Abrams, supra note 27, at 8–14. The following focuses on the historical 
background of the delinquency category.  
 39. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 942.  Confining juvenile delinquency 
proceedings to protect juveniles also meant they sacrificed some rights afforded them 
by the criminal justice system: for example, the right to a jury trial. See generally 
Martin R. Gardner, Punitive Juvenile Justice and Public Trials by Jury: Sixth 
Amendment Applications in a Post-McKeiver World, 91 NEB. L. REV. 1 (2012); 
Jennifer M. Segadelli, Minding the Gap: Extending Adult Jury Trial Rights to 
Adolescents While Maintaining a Childhood Commitment to Rehabilitation, 8 
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 683 (2010); Cart Rixey, Note, The Ultimate 
Disillusionment: The Need for Jury Trials in Juvenile Adjudications, 58 CATH. U. L. 
REV. 885 (2009). 
 40. Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions Are Not Enough: Problem-Solving 
Courts and the Impending Crisis of Legitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1472 (2004). 
 41. Id. at 1471.  
 42. Id.  
 43. Anita Nabha, Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in 
Court, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 1549, 1560 (2008).  
 44. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1303. 
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rehabilitation, civil jurisdiction, informal procedures, confidentiality, and 
separating juveniles from adult offenders.45   
These features were meant to protect juveniles from long-term negative 
consequences of their childhood misbehavior.  Juvenile courts had less formal 
procedures to make it easier for the juvenile to understand the process to 
which they were being subjected.46  To protect juveniles from public scrutiny, 
juvenile adjudications were closed to the public.47  Additionally, juvenile 
records were closed or expunged, and juveniles subject to adjudication were 
not saddled with a criminal record.48  Finally, when juveniles were sanctioned, 
they were sent to institutions that kept them separate from adult offenders.49  
This policy was meant to keep juveniles with a high probability of 
rehabilitation from being corrupted by hardened adult criminals.50  These 
protections remain largely intact in modern juvenile justice systems across the 
nation.   
The rehabilitative model changed the language used to talk about 
juvenile offenders and the length of their punishments.51  Juvenile offenders 
were not criminals who committed crimes, but delinquents who committed 
acts of delinquency.52  The model also affected the range of punishment 
children might receive when compared to adult sanctions for similar conduct.  
Further, because the system focused on rehabilitation, punishment was either 
more or less severe than an adult offender might have received for the same 
offense in the adult justice system.  This is because the rehabilitative model 
of juvenile courts relied heavily on the characteristics of the juvenile, largely 
unlike the adult criminal system.53  Juvenile courts also generally lost 
jurisdiction over juveniles when they reached the age of majority, meaning 
the length of their punishments was based heavily on their age.54   
For example, a juvenile offender who committed a property offense at 
the age of twelve might be placed in a juvenile center until he “phased out,” 
or reached an age beyond the juvenile court’s jurisdiction, less than a decade 
later.  An adult who commits the same property offense might only receive a 
few days’ jail time.  Meanwhile, an adult who was sentenced for a violent 
crime might be confined in prison for decades, but a juvenile found delinquent 
for the same crime would phase out at the same time as his juvenile 
counterpart who committed the property crime.55 
 
 45. ABRAMS ET AL., supra note 26, at 940.  
 46. Id. at 942–43. This was a widely debated topic throughout the twentieth 
century. Id. 
 47. Id.  
 48. Id. at 944.  
 49. Id. at 945.  
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 940.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. A similar hypothetical can be found in ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, at 941.  
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The rehabilitative model proved difficult to maintain, due in part to the 
resources needed to provide juvenile delinquents with individualized 
treatment and the growing national interest in tempering rising rates of 
juvenile delinquency.56  The rehabilitative model and the juvenile justice 
system began to face new challenges in the 1950s and 1960s. 
2.  The Mid-Twentieth Century Creates Cracks in the Rehabilitative 
Model 
The 1950s and 1960s were a time of increasing panic over children 
committing crimes, prompted in part by the rising delinquency rates of the 
previous two decades.57  According to Federal Bureau of Investigation 
statistics from the era, juvenile court cases increased 220% between 1941 and 
1957.58  Public concern over juvenile crime reached an all-time high as the 
media declared, “Today’s delinquents kill.”59  Even courts were concerned 
about the growing rates of delinquency, as demonstrated by a Boston juvenile 
court judge who proclaimed, “We have the spectacle of an entire city 
terrorized by one-half of one-percent of its residents.  And the terrorists are 
children.”60 
In response to the growing public fear, Congress began to take a special 
interest in the problem of juvenile delinquency.  In 1953, the United States 
Senate Committee to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency was created and 
represented the growing congressional fear about the dangers of juvenile 
delinquency.61  Congress remained entrenched in dialogue over juvenile 
delinquency until the 1960s.62  In 1960, Congress created a national 
delinquency task force.63  In 1961, it passed the Juvenile Delinquency and 
 
 56. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1303. 
 57. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, at 932–46.  The Children’s Bureau explained 
the rise in delinquency rates during World War II by stating juveniles were turning to 
a life of crime because they were left unsupervised by fathers who were overseas 
fighting in the war and by mothers who were forced to work to provide for both their 
families and wartime needs. Id.   
 58. Jason Barnosky, The Violent Years: Responses to Juvenile Crime in the 
1950s, 38 POLITY 314, 320 (2006).  
 59. All Our Children, NEWSWEEK Nov. 9, 1953, at 28–30; see also Barnosky, 
supra note 58, at 322. 
 60. All Our Children, supra note 59, at 28–30; see also Barnosky, supra note 58, 
at 322. 
 61. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, at 932–46.  The Committee held televised 
hearings in 1955 at the behest of Senator Estes Kefauver from Tennessee. At these 
hearings, the Children’s Bureau reported the United States would have 40% more 
juveniles by 1960 because of the increase in births post-World War II (a phenomenon 
now known as “baby boomers”). Id. at 933–34.  
 62. Id. at 934.  
 63. Id. at 932–46.   
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Youth Offense Control Act.64  The 1968 Presidential campaigns frequently 
discussed delinquency prevention.65  
As Congress sought to pass legislation to address juvenile delinquency, 
the rehabilitative model of the juvenile system began to seem untenable.  Due 
to the rising number of juvenile delinquents, the juvenile court system became 
overburdened.66  The system lacked the resources to effectively provide 
individualized, rehabilitative treatment as initially intended.67  Juveniles 
would stay in treatment facilities for periods ranging from weeks to years, 
often with no follow-up treatment or guidance to prevent recidivism.68  
Juvenile courts became a place where delinquents were abandoned without 
the necessary resources or many constitutional protections of the adult 
criminal justice system.  
In the late 1960s, the United States Supreme Court stepped in to provide 
juveniles with more traditional criminal due process rights.  First, in Kent v. 
United States,69 the Court decided juvenile courts can waive jurisdiction over 
a juvenile but only after a full investigation based on the individual 
characteristics of the juvenile offender.70  Kent also ruled juvenile courts 
seeking to waive jurisdiction over a juvenile must provide the juvenile with a 
hearing, a statement of reasons for denial, and effective assistance of 
counsel.71  Second, in In re Gault,72 the Court held “neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”73  Gault extended to 
juveniles the right to notice of charges, counsel, confrontation and cross-
examination of witnesses, and the privilege against compulsory self-
incrimination.74  Third, In re Winship held the standard of proof for 
delinquency cases is proving the act of delinquency “beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”75  These protections all sought to create a balance between providing 
an informal procedure juveniles can understand while providing them 
constitutional protections to safeguard their rights within that system.  In 
1971, however, some Justices on the Court expressed ambivalence towards 
 
 64. Id.  The law had a three-year authorization and was focused on finding new 
methods of delinquency prevention and control.  The Juvenile Delinquency and Youth 
Offenses Control Act, Pub. L. No. 87-274, 75 Stat. 572-574.  
 65. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, 934.  
 66. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1303. 
 67. Id.  
 68. Id. at 1303–04.  
 69. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).  
 70. Id. at 553–54.   
 71. Id. at 554. 
 72. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).  
 73. Id. at 13.   
 74. Id. at 33–57.  
 75. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970).  The Court stated, “In sum, the 
constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is as much required 
during the adjudicatory stage of a delinquency proceedings as are those constitutional 
safeguards applied in Gault . . . .” Id.  
9
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creating a juvenile justice system that too-closely mimicked the criminal 
justice system, and the Court refused to extend the right to a trial by jury to 
the juvenile justice system.76  
3.  The Rise of the Super-Predator and the Fall of the Rehabilitative 
Model 
While societal concern over juvenile delinquency grew throughout the 
1950s and 1960s, it was only a murmur compared to the uproar over juvenile 
delinquency in the 1980s and 1990s.  In President Bill Clinton’s 1997 State of 
the Union address, he declared “a full-scale assault on juvenile crime” while 
calling for new legislation focusing on more resources for prosecuting offices, 
tougher penalties, and stricter laws to prevent juveniles from accessing guns.77  
His remarks reflected the increasing concern regarding juvenile crime in the 
late-twentieth century.   
In the 1970s, state juvenile systems began moving away from a 
rehabilitative model because such programs were deemed expensive, time-
consuming, and ineffective in reducing recidivism rates.78  The rates of crimes 
such as homicide and gun possession by juveniles were on the rise.79  This 
perception was coupled with the growing public sentiment that juveniles were 
simultaneously becoming more systematic and calloused in committing acts 
of delinquency.80  These fears were perpetuated by academics, most notably 
Professor John DiIulio of Princeton.81  DiIulio coined the phrase “super-
predator” to describe “a young juvenile criminal who is so impulsive, so 
remorseless that he can kill, rape, maim, without giving a second thought.”82  
Popular news media latched onto this inflated sense of fear to warn the public 
 
 76. See In re Gault 387 U.S. 1, 76–77 (1967) (J. Harlan, dissenting); McKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971).  
 77. President Clinton’s Message to Congress on the State of the Union, THE N.Y. 
TIMES (Feb. 5, 1997) https://www.nytimes.com/1997/02/05/us/president-clinton-s-
message-to-congress-on-the-state-of-the-union.html [perma.cc/5QR3-UL7T]. 
 78. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1307. 
 79. A report released by the office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention (“OJJDP”) in 1996 states, “The juvenile violent crime arrest rate remained 
relatively constant from the early 1970’s to the late 1980’s, increased 64% between 
1988 and 1994, and dropped 12% from 1994 to 1996. Similarly, the number of 
juveniles arrested for murder more than doubled between the mid-1980’s and the peak 
in 1993, representing a percentage change far greater than the increase in adult murder 
arrests.” OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATE LEGISLATIVE 
RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 1996-97 UPDATE (1998), available at 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172835.pdf [perma.cc/BAD3-LWJ2]. 
 80. Priyanka Boghani, They Were Sentenced as “Superpredators.” Who Were 
They Really? PBS FRONTLINE (May 2, 2017) https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/arti 
cle/they-were-sentenced-as-superpredators-who-were-they-really/ [perma.cc/G7R7-
EMCS]. 
 81. See id. 
 82. Id.  
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 85, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol85/iss1/8
2020] RAISE THE AGE LEGISLATION 201 
that juveniles represented a growing threat to the safety of communities across 
the nation.83   
Legislators responded to growing public alarm by passing legislation 
designed to toughen the consequences of juvenile delinquency.84  New 
legislation focused on incapacitation rather than rehabilitation; its goal was to 
prevent the juvenile offenders from committing offenses by restricting their 
freedom through confinement.85  Nearly every state passed legislation 
allowing certain juveniles to be transferred to the criminal courts for trial and 
sentencing.86  During this time, hundreds of juveniles were sentenced to life 
imprisonment.87   
Fears about juvenile “super-predators” proved misplaced. In 2015, the 
Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention reported the juvenile 
arrest rate for all offenses peaked in 1996 and then declined sixty-five percent 
by 2014.88  A “juvenile violence epidemic” never occurred.89  
Concern about juvenile delinquency waned in the late 1990s and the 
early twenty-first century as juvenile arrest rates fell, state budgets declined 
nationwide, and scientific research shed new light on adolescent 
 
 83. See generally, Nina J. Easton, The Crime Doctor is In But Not Everyone Likes 
Prof. John DiIulio’s Message: There is No Big Fix, L.A. TIMES (May 2, 1995), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1995-05-02-ls-61478-story.html 
[perma.cc/XV74-R5M3]; John J. DiIulio, Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, 
WASH. EXAMINER (Nov. 27, 1995), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-
standard/the-coming-of-the-super-predators [perma.cc/RN9R-SEGE]; Lori 
Montgomery, ‘Super-Predator’ – Or Just a Kid With a Gun? Skyrocketing Number of 
Teen Killers Brings Debate on Causes, SEATTLE TIMES (May 30, 1996), 
http://community.seattletimes.nwsource.com/archive/?date=19960530&slug=23319
69 [perma.cc/738R-6934]. 
 84. See e.g., STATE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO VIOLENT JUVENILE CRIME: 
1996–97 UPDATE, supra note 79. 
 85. O’Connor & Treat, supra note 30, at 1307–08. 
 86. Jesenia M. Pizarro, Steven M. Chermak & Jeffrey A. Gruenewald, Juvenile 
‘Super-Predators’ in the News: A Comparison of Adult and Juvenile Homicide, 14 J. 
CRIM. JUST. AND POP. CULT. 84, 85 (2007); Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence 
Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-
superpredator-threat-of-90s.html [perma.cc/5ENN-7E9X]. 
 87. Haberman, supra note 86. 
 88. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, JUVENILE ARREST RATES 
FOR ALL CRIMES, 1980–2014 (2015), available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/cri 
me/JAR_Display.asp?ID=qa05201 [perma.cc/WGC7-PV5Y]. 
 89. JAMES C. HOWELL, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A 
COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK 16 (2008), available at https://www.sagepub.com/sites 
/default/files/upm-binaries/27206_1.pdf [perma.cc/E9H2-9AF6]; David Westphal, 
Youth Crime Plunge Shoots Down Scare: Trend Refutes Predictions of ‘Super-
Predator’; Experts Are Divided Over Reason for Turnaround, PITTSBURG POST-
GAZETTE, Dec. 13, 1999, at A-13.   
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development.90  The public became less accepting of policies and sentencing 
procedures that ignored maturity and age.91  By 2014, public opinion seemed 
to favor juvenile justice policies with a renewed focus on rehabilitation.92  At 
the same time, juvenile offenders placed in residential facilities declined fifty-
four percent for all offenses between 1997 and 2015.93  State legislatures 
began to soften some “tough on crime” reforms passed in the 1990s.94  For 
example, between 2011 and 2013, Missouri made several significant reforms 
to its juvenile justice system.95  First, Missouri narrowed its transfer and 
waiver criteria, giving juvenile courts more options to address juvenile 
delinquency.96  Missouri also rolled back its “once an adult, always an adult” 
law that mandated juveniles who had been transferred to adult courts once 
would never be allowed in juvenile court again.97   
As a result of changing public attitudes towards juvenile justice over 
several decades, the contemporary juvenile justice system has become 
fragmented and often overburdened.  For example, in 2014, juvenile courts 
handled an estimated 975,000 delinquency cases or approximately 2700 cases 
per day.98  This means delinquency “hearings” sometimes amount to no more 
than ten-to-fifteen-minute interviews between the judge and the juvenile 
because judges are unable to devote any time beyond that to individual 
cases.99  Meanwhile, many juvenile residential facilities across the nation have 
been havens for scandal, violence, and abuse.100   
 
 90. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, 935. 
 91. Id.   
 92. Public Opinion on Juvenile Justice in America, PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS 
(2014), available at https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2015/08/pspp_juvenile 
_poll_web.pdf [perma.cc/5NEB-X5FR].  For example, 75% of poll respondents 
indicated a preference to “getting juvenile offenders the treatment, counseling, and 
supervision they need to make it less likely they will commit another crime, even if 
that means they spend no time in a juvenile corrections facility,” over an option that 
favors juvenile offenders receiving serious punishment for their offenses. Id. 
 93. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILES IN RESIDENTIAL PLACEMENT, 2015 (2018).  
 94. See, e.g., NAT’L CONF. OF S. LEGISLATURES, TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE 
STATE LEGISLATION 2011-2015 (2015); PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, HAWAII’S 2014 
JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM (2014); IL. JUVENILE JUSTICE COMM’N., BURDENED FOR 
LIFE: THE MYTH OF JUVENILE RECORD CONFIDENTIALITY AND EXPUNGEMENT IN 
ILLINOIS (2016).   
 95. TRENDS IN JUVENILE JUSTICE STATE LEGISLATION 2011–2015, supra note 94. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. SARAH HOCKENBERRY & CHARLES PUZZANCHERA, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. 
JUST., JUVENILE COURT STATISTICS 2014, at 6 (2017), 
http://www.ncjj.org/pdf/jcsreports/jcs2014.pdf [perma.cc/4GFQ-CHEQ]. 
 99. ABRAMS et al., supra note 26, 935. 
 100. See e.g., RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., MALTREATMENT OF 
YOUTH IN U.S. JUVENILE CORRECTIONS FACILITIES 3 (2015); Emily Ramshaw, Sexual 
Abuse in State Lock-ups, TEX. TRIBUNE (Jan. 7, 2010), https://www.texastribune.org/ 
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The evolution of the juvenile justice system over time demonstrates a 
national struggle to balance the perceived innocence of children with the 
shock of their sometimes-horrific wrongdoing.  Missouri’s juvenile justice 
system has not been immune to these challenges.  Despite this, the 
contemporary Missouri juvenile system is one of the foremost juvenile 
systems in the nation.  Since the late twentieth-century, Missouri has been a 
model juvenile system, and its focus on individualized rehabilitation for its 
juveniles has been dubbed the “Missouri Miracle.”   
B.  The Missouri Miracle: How Missouri’s Juvenile System Became a 
National Model 
Like most states, Missouri housed juveniles in centralized, prison-like 
conditions between the late-nineteenth and late-twentieth centuries.  In 1889, 
Missouri constructed two reform schools to house delinquent children, with a 
third being built several years later.101  Missouri Governor Alexander Dockery 
signed legislation establishing juvenile courts in the City of St. Louis and 
Jackson County on March 23, 1903, just four years after Cook County, Illinois 
established the first juvenile court in the nation.102  By the time these courts 
were established, the reform schools were not educational havens so much as 
“warehouses” to hold children.103  Despite the establishment of separate 
juvenile courts, Missouri did not immediately change how it housed 
delinquent juveniles.  Conditions in the reform schools remained deplorable 
throughout the twentieth century because the schools held abuse and neglect 
victims with juveniles who committed serious, violent offenses.104  This 
system of confining children together regardless of the reason the juvenile was 
placed in the reform school led to widespread problems.  Physical and 
emotional abuse by both other juveniles and guards, suicide, and escapes were 
 
2010/01/07/15-of-tx-youth-offenders-forced-into-sex-acts/ [perma.cc/P47H-97YP]; 
‘Kids for Cash’ Captures A Juvenile Justice Scandal From Two Sides, NAT’L PUB. 
RADIO (Mar. 8, 2014), https://www.npr.org/2014/03/08/287286626/kids-for-cash-
captures-a-juvenile-justice-scandal-from-two-sides [perma.cc/YNL9-RFKZ]; Nancy 
Phillips & Chris Palmer, Death, Rapes, and Broken Bones at Philly’s Only Residential 
Treatment Center for Troubled Youth, INQUIRER (Apr. 22, 2017), 
https://www.inquirer.com/philly/news/pennsylvania/philadelphia/Death-rape-
Philadelphia-Wordsworth-residential-treatment-center-troubled-youth.html 
[perma.cc/AZQ6-85Y8]; David Jackson, Gary Marx, & Duaa Eldeib, Children 
Attacked, Abused at Taxpayer-Funded Living Centers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE (Dec. 3, 
2014), https://www.chicagotribune.com/investigations/ct-youth-treatment-crisis-
new-met-20141203-story.html [perma.cc/A2EY-QNYS]. 
 101. Abrams, supra note 27, at 13. 
 102. JAMES D. REED, MO. JUVENILE JUSTICE ASS’N, CELEBRATING 100 YEARS OF 
JUVENILE JUSTICE IN MISSOURI 1903–2003 (2003). 
 103. Abrams, supra note 27, at 13.  The three reform schools were the Missouri 
Reform School for Boys in Boonville, the State Industrial Home for Girls in 
Chillicothe, and the State Industrial School for Negro Girls in Tipton. Id. 
 104. Id.  
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all commonplace in the reform schools.105  In 1950, social worker Albert 
Deutsch characterized the Boonville school as a “hellhole” with a “long-
standing tradition of sadistic maltreatment.”106   
In 1974, Missouri created the Division of Youth Services (“Missouri 
DYS”) within the Department of Social Services.107  The new agency oversaw 
the care and treatment of vulnerable juveniles committed to it by the state’s 
juvenile or family courts.108  By the 1980s, Missouri DYS found the violence 
and indignity of the Missouri reform schools was severely harming vulnerable 
juveniles.  As a result, the State closed the Chillicothe girls’ school in 1981 
and the Boonville boys’ school in 1983.109  While the rest of the nation 
focused its attention on get-tough measures to address the growing concerns 
over violent juvenile crime,110  Missouri initiated a change focused on 
restoring and rehabilitating vulnerable youth.  A fifteen-member advisory 
board focused on developing a new juvenile policy that was rehabilitative and 
therapeutic rather than punitive and confining.111  Throughout the 1980s, 
Missouri DYS replaced the reform schools with small, regional facilities that 
kept children close to their homes and families.112 
Today, Missouri DYS has divided the state into five regions, operates 
thirty residential facilities, and works closely with Missouri’s forty-five 
juvenile courts.113  During the 2017 fiscal year, Missouri DYS received 621 
new youth commitments with an average age of fifteen years old.114  That 
same year, its residential facilities served 1535 juveniles.  Delinquents are 
committed to Missouri DYS when the juvenile court determines there is no 
community-based service suitable for the juvenile.115  Missouri DYS retains 
jurisdiction over any juvenile in its care until his or her eighteenth birthday, 
although under special circumstances Missouri DYS can retain jurisdiction 
until a juvenile’s twenty-first birthday.116  Missouri DYS is authorized by law 
to create a wide array of treatment programs, including: maximum security 
facilities, moderate care facilities, group homes, day treatment programs, 
 
 105. THE MO. YOUTH SERVS. INST., APPROACH FOR POSITIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE 
OUTCOMES 9 (2016). 
 106. Abrams, supra note 27, at 13. 
 107. Who We Are, THE MISSOURI APPROACH, 
http://missouriapproach.org/approach/ [perma.cc/YS8H-H9F4] (last visited Dec. 18, 
2019). 
 108. Id.  
 109. Abrams, supra note 27, at 22. 
 110. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 111. Abrams, supra note 27, at 22. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.; see also About DYS, MISSOURI DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DIV. OF YOUTH 
SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/about-dys.htm [perma.cc/9RX6-F4HK] (last visited 
Dec. 18, 2019). 
 114. MISSOURI DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DIV. OF YOUTH SERVS., 2017 ANNUAL 
REPORT 26 (2017). 
 115. Mo. Rev. Stat. § 219.021.1 (2018).  
 116. Id. 
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family foster homes, aftercare services, educational services, and counseling 
services.117 
Missouri DYS brands itself as “rehabilitative and therapeutic” over 
“correctional.”118  Juveniles committed to Missouri DYS are placed in the 
least restrictive facilities needed to support their treatment.119  The residential 
facilities vary in security level, but all offer a range of services, including: 
individual and group treatment, life skills training, community service, family 
engagement opportunities, family treatment, and education services.120  
Juveniles live in dorm-style rooms, wear their own clothes, and are allowed 
to decorate personal spaces.121  Even at the maximum security facilities, 
juveniles can play with pets and attend programs like summer basketball 
camp.122 
Missouri DYS is charged with serving many of Missouri’s most 
vulnerable juveniles: many Missouri DYS commitments struggle with 
educational and mental disabilities.  Of juveniles committed to Missouri DYS, 
twenty-six percent receiving educational services in 2017 had an educational 
disability; thirty-nine percent of Missouri DYS commitments had a history of 
prior mental health treatment; and forty-six percent of juveniles had a history 
of prior substance abuse.123  
Despite the challenges juveniles carry with them to Missouri DYS, they 
are overwhelmingly successful after they are discharged.  In 2017, Missouri 
DYS reported a “law-abiding rate” – defined as the percentage of juveniles 
discharged from DYS who are not recommitted or incarcerated in adult 
prisons after three years – of nearly seventy-three percent.124  Missouri DYS 
is successful in offering juveniles at their most vulnerable the resources they 
need to cope with difficult circumstances.  Because of this success, Missouri 
DYS is an example for other states looking to revamp their juvenile justice 
systems.125 
 
 117. § 219.021.7. 
 118. About the Missouri Approach, THE MISSOURI APPROACH, 
http://missouriapproach.org/approach/ [perma.cc/YS8H-H9F4] (last visited Dec. 18, 
2019). 
 119. Id.  
 120. Residential Treatment, MISSOURI DEP’T OF SOCIAL SERVS., DIV. OF YOUTH 
SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/residential-treatment.htm [perma.cc/76XH-FZ2Z] 
(last visited Dec. 18, 2019). 
 121. RICHARD A. MENDEL, ANNIE E. CASEY FOUND., THE MISSOURI MODEL: 
REINVENTING THE PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS 19 (2015) 
 122. Jenifer Warren, Spare the Rod, Save the Child, L.A. TIMES (July 1, 2004), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2004-jul-01-me-juvie1-story.html 
[perma.cc/52L9-6FL6].  
 123. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 26. 
 124. Id.   
 125. See e.g., Carol Marbin Miller & Audra D.S. Burch, How NYC and Missouri 
Are Reforming Juvenile Justice — Without Razor Wire Fences, MIAMI HERALD (Oct. 
10, 2017), https://www.miamiherald.com/news/special-reports/florida-
prisons/article177946631.html; Selena Teji, Bringing the Missouri Model to 
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Over time, society’s understanding of juveniles who commit acts of 
delinquency has evolved to focus more on rehabilitation and less on 
punishment.  While early American law punished children as adults, 
modernly, children are treated in a completely different setting than adults.  
Both policymakers and courts have changed their thinking to reflect the 
differences between juveniles and adults.  The focus on rehabilitation that led 
to the creation of juvenile courts has been expanded by courts and legislatures 
through limiting the types of punishments that can be given to juveniles and 
by making it harder for juveniles to be addressed by the adult system.  The 
next Section outlines these legal changes.   
III.  THE BIRTH OF THE “RAISE THE AGE” MOVEMENT 
Both state legislatures and the United States Supreme Court experienced 
their own versions of the “Raise the Age” movement.  Section A lays the 
foundation for the various factors prompting the “Raise the Age” movement.  
Section B then illustrates how various states passed their own versions of 
“Raise the Age” legislation.  Finally, Section C demonstrates how the United 
States Supreme Court also “raised the age” for the harshest sentences courts 
give out: the death penalty and life without the possibility of parole.   
A.  The Rise of Neuroscience and the Fall of “Tough on Crime” 
Policies 
As discussed in Part II, fears over juvenile super-predators prompted an 
increase in the number of ways juveniles can end up in the adult criminal 
justice system.  Nearly forty years later, research on adolescent brain 
development and the consequences of confining juvenile offenders in adult 
facilities has demonstrated policies aimed at treating juvenile offenders as 
adults are ineffective and detrimental to those juveniles’ health and future 
opportunities.  
First, the “Raise the Age” movement is largely driven by research on 
adolescent brain development.126  Research now suggests the brain is not fully 
developed until an individual’s mid-twenties, meaning adolescents and young 
adults are more likely than persons younger or older to engage in risky and 
criminal behavior.127  Recent advancements in developmental science and 
neuroscience have posited this increased susceptibility for risky behavior is 
likely the result of parts of the adolescent brain developing at different 
 
California, CTR. ON JUV. JUST. AND CRIM. JUST. (Dec. 20, 2010), 
http://www.cjcj.org/news/5349 [perma.cc/VX8Y-ZJJ7]. 
 126. Stephanie Tabashneck, “Raise the Age” Legislation: Developmentally 
Tailored Justice, 34 AM. BAR ASS’N: CRIM. JUST. 13–17 (Winter 2018). 
 127. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Brain Science and Juvenile Justice 
Policymaking, 23 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 410, 416 (2016). 
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paces.128  Essentially, the brain’s sensation-seeking centers develop faster in 
adolescence than centers controlling self-regulation.129   
During adolescence, brain systems responsible for self-regulation of 
appetitive, emotional, and social stimuli are relatively immature.130  The 
maturity of these brain systems are positively correlated with impulse 
control.131  While these systems remain immature during adolescence, there 
is increasing activity in the limbic system responsible for processing 
emotional and social information, including risk-assessment and predicting 
rewards and punishments of some behaviors.132  In other words, during 
adolescence, teenagers experience a “hypersensitivity to emotional content” 
while their ability to self-regulate their reactions to those emotions and 
accurately predict the consequences of their behavior have not yet fully 
developed.133  The developing relationship between these two brain systems, 
dubbed the “dual systems model,” makes teenagers particularly susceptible to 
high-risk criminal behavior.134   
Second, by the early 2000s, it was clear the “tough on crime” policies of 
the 1980s and 1990s that often resulted in holding juveniles in adult prisons 
had produced serious, long-lasting, negative consequences.  Children 
sentenced in adult courts and confined in adult prisons face exposure to 
extreme violence, abuse, and disease.135  By the time the “Raise the Age” 
movement gained traction, a clear solution to keeping juveniles safe was to 
remove them from the dangers of adult prisons.   
In adult prisons, children are more likely to witness and suffer extreme 
violence and abuse.136  Children in adult facilities are twice as likely to be 
beaten by a staff member or attacked with a weapon than children placed in 
juvenile facilities.137  Juveniles confined in adult facilities are also at the 
greatest risk of being sexually abused.138  For example, in 2005, juveniles 
made up less than one percent of all adult jail inmates, but they accounted for 
twenty-one percent of all victims of inmate-perpetrated sexual violence.139  In 
2009, eighty-percent of the 420 boys serving life without the possibility of 
parole sentences in Michigan, Illinois, and Missouri reported being sexually 
 
 128. Id. at 413.  
 129. Id. at 413–14.  
 130. Id. at 414.  
 131. Id.  
 132. Id.  
 133. Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 16. 
 134. Steinberg, supra note 127, at 414; Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 16. 
 135. CELIA HARRIS ET AL., HUM. IMPACT PARTNERS, JUVENILE INJUSTICE: 
CHARGING YOUTH AS ADULTS IS INEFFECTIVE, BIASED, AND HARMFUL 19 (2017). 
 136. Id.  
 137. Id. at 21.   
 138. Id. at 22.  
 139. NAT’L PRISON RAPE ELIMINATION COMM’N, NATIONAL PRISON RAPE 
ELIMINATION COMMISSION REPORT 155 (2009). 
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abused within the first year of their sentences.140  Sexual abuse in prisons is 
so pervasive that, in 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act 
(“PREA”) in an attempt to lower rates of sexual violence in adult and juvenile 
detention facilities.141  Congress found “[j]uveniles are 5 times more likely to 
be sexually assaulted in adult rather than juvenile facilities – often within the 
first 48 hours of incarceration.”142  Under PREA, juvenile inmates may not be 
held in housing units where they will have “sight, sound, or physical contact” 
with adult inmates.143  States must “make best efforts” to avoid placing 
juvenile inmates in solitary confinement, but many teenagers are still placed 
in isolation for up to twenty-three hours a day, leading to a host of mental and 
physical health problems.144   
Juveniles held in adult facilities are also more likely to suffer from 
disease.145  This is due in part to the conditions of prison life, including 
overcrowding, loss of privacy, increase in stress, violence, isolation, and 
barriers to accessing healthcare.146  Incarcerated populations are more likely 
to suffer from hypertension, asthma, and arthritis.147  Beyond suffering 
physical ailments, juveniles serving sentences in adult prisons are also likely 
to suffer from at least one psychiatric disorder.  In 2015, sixty-six percent of 
juveniles addressed by adult courts had one psychiatric disorder and forty-
three percent had two or more disorders.148  Juveniles are thirty-six times more 
likely to commit suicide in adult prisons than in juvenile facilities.149  This is 
especially concerning because between 2002 and 2005, suicide was the 
leading cause of death for juveniles detained in state juvenile facilities.150   
Research on adolescent brain development and the harmful effects of 
holding juveniles in adult facilities has led many states to recognize adult 
facilities are dangerous and counterproductive places to house juvenile 
offenders.  To solve this problem, states began rolling back “get tough on 
crime” policies that made it more likely for juveniles to find themselves in 
adult prisons.  One such reform – “Raise the Age” legislation – protects 
juveniles from being tried in adult courts at all.   
 
 140. Id. at 156.  
 141. 34 U.S.C. § 30302 (2018). 
 142. § 30301(4).  
 143. 28 C.F.R. § 115.14 (2018).  This policy has been mandated since the passage 
of the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974. See ABRAMS ET AL., 
supra note 26, at 932–46. 
 144. See, e.g., Lisa Armstrong, A Teen-Ager in Solitary Confinement, NEW 
YORKER (Dec. 4, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/a-teen-ager-
in-solitary-confinement [perma.cc/5UKQ-EUL7]. 
 145. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 135, at 19. 
 146. Id.  
 147. Id. at 20.  
 148. JASON J. WASHBURN ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND 
DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, DETAINED YOUTH PROCESSED IN JUVENILE AND ADULT 
COURT: PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS AND MENTAL HEALTH NEEDS 6–7 (2015). 
 149. HARRIS ET AL., supra note 135, at 23. 
 150. Id.  
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B.  Brief Legislative History of “Raise the Age” Statutes  
The year 2019 marked the first time in United States history that sixteen-
year-old juveniles were not automatically treated as adults in the criminal 
justice system in any state nationwide; a feat accomplished largely through 
“Raise the Age” legislation.151  States have been passing “Raise the Age” 
legislation for over a decade.  In 2007, fourteen states continued to 
automatically exclude some juveniles under the age of eighteen from juvenile 
court jurisdiction, and approximately 175,000 juveniles were automatically 
tried in the adult criminal system.152  In 2019, the number of juveniles 
automatically excluded from the juvenile system is expected to fall to between 
35,000 and 40,000.153  After the passage of Missouri’s Senate Bill 793, only 
four states continue to automatically exclude juveniles from the juvenile 
system, and all four of those states have recently considered “Raise the Age” 
legislation.154   
In 2007, Connecticut passed Senate Bill 1500, which raised the age of 
juvenile court jurisdiction from sixteen to eighteen.155  Connecticut 
implemented its legislation in stages, and full implementation occurred in 
2012.156  Illinois also raised the age in steps; in 2009, Illinois raised the age 
for juvenile misdemeanors from seventeen to eighteen.157  When none of the 
anticipated negative consequences – i.e., potential rising costs, decreased 
public safety, and overburdening the juvenile system – occurred, Illinois 
raised the age for juvenile felonies from seventeen to eighteen in 2013.158  
Also in 2013, Massachusetts raised the age of juvenile court jurisdiction from 
seventeen to eighteen.159  In 2014, New Hampshire followed suit with the 
passage of House Bill 1624.160  Louisiana and South Carolina both raised the 
age in 2016.161  New York and North Carolina became the last states before 
the passage of Missouri Senate Bill 793 to pass “Raise the Age” legislation.162 
 
 151. JEREE THOMAS, CAMPAIGN FOR YOUTH JUSTICE, RAISING THE BAR: STATE 
TRENDS IN KEEPING YOUTH OUT OF ADULT COURTS (2015–2017), at 3 (2017). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 10.  
 154. Those states are Texas, Michigan, Georgia, and Wisconsin. Tabashneck, 
supra note 126, at 18–19; THOMAS, supra note 151, at 8. 
 155. See S. 1500, 2007 Gen. Assemb., Spec. Sess. (Conn. 2007).  
 156. Id.  
 157. S. 2275, 95th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2009). 
 158. H.R. 2404, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013).  
 159. H.B. 1432, 188th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013).  
 160. H.B. 1624, 2014 Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2014).  
 161. S.B. 324, 2016 Reg. Sess. (La. 2016); S.B. 916, 121st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (S.C. 2016).  
 162. Jesse McKinley, ‘Raise the Age,’ Now Law in New York, Is Still a Subject of 
Debate, THE N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/10/nyre 
gion/raise-the-age-new-york.html [perma.cc/3X9Y-88WX]; S.B. 257, 2017 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2017). 
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Congress has also considered legislation to incentivize states to “raise 
the age.”  Senators Rand Paul (R-Ky.) and Cory Booker (D-N.J.) offered the 
Record Expungement Designed to Enhance Employment (“REDEEM”) Act 
in 2013,163 2015,164 and 2017.165  The REDEEM Act would offer states who 
pass “Raise the Age” legislation priority when applying for federal grants 
through the Community Oriented Policing Services (“COPS”) program.166  
Despite bipartisan support, the bill has failed to make it out of committee.167 
Even without REDEEM Act incentives, states continue to consider 
legislation to “raise the age” even beyond the age of eighteen.  In 2016, 
Vermont became the first state in the nation to pass legislation that raises the 
age of juvenile court jurisdiction beyond age eighteen, to twenty-one.168  
Several more states are now considering the same.169  In 2017, Massachusetts 
state legislators considered Senate Bill 947, which would raise the age of 
juvenile court jurisdiction to twenty-one years old.170  Further, Connecticut’s 
“Raise the Age” legislation has been so successful in its implementation – by 
lowering recidivism rates,171 saving state funds,172 and maintaining the 
juvenile system’s caseload173 – that Connecticut’s then-Governor Dannel 
Malloy offered legislation in 2018 to raise the age of juvenile court 
jurisdiction to twenty-one.174 
The overwhelmingly positive trend in the passage of “Raise the Age” 
legislation suggests it is only a matter of time before every state automatically 
handles juveniles under the age of eighteen within the juvenile justice system.  
The “Raise the Age” trend is not confined to legislatures: the United States 
 
 163. S. 2567, 113th Cong. (2013).  
 164. S. 675, 114th Cong. (2015).  
 165. S. 827, 115th Cong. (2017).  
 166. Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 19; Ed O’Keefe, Cory Booker, Rand Paul 




 167. Tabashneck, supra note 126, at 19. 
 168. H.B. 95, 2016 Gen. Assemb, Reg. Sess. (Vt. 2016).  
 169. THOMAS, supra note 151, at 19; see also Katie Lannan, Mass. Watching as 




 170. S.B. 947, 190th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2017).  
 171. JUV. JUST. INST., RAISING THE AGE: SHIFTING TO A SAFER AND MORE 
EFFECTIVE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 40 (2017). 
 172. Id.   
 173. Id.  
 174. Rich Scinto, Malloy Pushes to ‘Raise the Age’ to 21 for Many Crimes, PATCH 
(Mar. 20, 2018), https://patch.com/connecticut/ridgefield/malloy-pushes-raise-age-
21-many-crimes [perma.cc/VKA3-A5WT]. 
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Supreme Court has also recently “raised the age” for the harshest forms of 
punishment.   
C.  The United States Supreme Court “Raises the Age” for Severe 
Punishments  
This Section focuses on several key United States Supreme Court 
decisions on the constitutionality of two types of punishment for juvenile 
offenders: the death penalty and life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole (“LWOP”).  The Court’s decisions have largely reflected the overall 
social attitude of the times.  In the late twentieth century, as fear over juvenile 
“super-predators” grew, the Court ruled the juvenile death penalty was 
constitutional.  By the 2010s, when the legislative “Raise the Age” movement 
was gaining traction, the Court barred both capital punishment of juveniles 
and mandatory LWOP sentences for juvenile offenders.  As the next Section 
illustrates, the same arguments in favor of “raising the age” of juvenile court 
jurisdictions – the neuroscience of juvenile brains and their incompatibility 
with adult prisons – also shaped the Justices’ thinking on juveniles’ eligibility 
for certain punishments.175   
1.  The Death of the Juvenile Death Penalty 
In the 1970s, as the juvenile justice system was walking back the 
rehabilitative model of addressing juvenile delinquency, the death penalty 
became a hotly debated topic.176  The United States Supreme Court decided 
numerous death penalty cases, including cases involving the constitutionality 
of executing persons who were juveniles when they committed their capital 
crimes.  Between 1973 and 2005, the United States executed twenty-two 
juveniles.177  In the 1980s, the United States Supreme Court set an age limit 
on the use of the death penalty, but the execution of anyone under the age of 
 
 175. Notably, the Court is posed to decide another case regarding juvenile 
sentencing in the adult system.  On March 18, 2019, the United States Supreme Court 
granted a writ for certiorari in Mathena v. Malvo, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019) (Mem.).  The 
issue in that case was whether the Court’s holdings in Miller and Montgomery apply 
regardless of whether a state characterizes its sentencing scheme as “mandatory” or 
“discretionary.” Respondent’s Brief at 19, Mathena v. Malvo, 139 S. Ct. 1317 (2019) 
(No. 18-217). 
 176. See generally Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Gregg v. Georgia, 
428 U.S. 153, 188 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts 
v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).   
 177. VICTOR L. STREIB, THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY TODAY: DEATH 
SENTENCES AND EXECUTIONS FOR JUVENILE CRIMES, JANUARY 1, 1973 – FEBRUARY 
28, 2005, at 3 (2005), available at http://www2.law.columbia.edu/fagan/courses/law_ 
socialscience/juvenile_justice/documents/Streib_JuvDeathMar2004.pdf 
[perma.cc/2X3F-EUQQ].  Between 1973 and 2005, Missouri sentenced four juvenile 
offenders to death and ranked fourteen out of twenty-three states that allowed the 
execution of juveniles. Id. at 10. 
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eighteen at the time of their crime was not declared unconstitutional until 
2005.  
The United States Supreme Court did not bar the execution of persons 
because of their youth until 1988.178  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, the Court 
held that executing juveniles for capital crimes they committed while fifteen-
years old or younger violated the Eighth Amendment’s bar against “cruel and 
unusual” punishment.179  The Court, in a plurality opinion, found fifteen-year 
old juveniles are “less mature and responsible than adults.”180  The plurality 
concluded, “Given the lesser culpability of the juvenile offender, the 
teenager’s capacity for growth, and society’s fiduciary obligation to its 
children, this conclusion is simply inapplicable to the execution of a [fifteen-
year-old] offender.”181   
The Court drew a bright line in Thompson: juveniles fifteen-years old or 
younger are categorically less culpable than adults and thus cannot be 
executed by the state for their crimes.  But the Court was hesitant to apply this 
reasoning to all juveniles under the age of majority.  Just one year after the 
decision in Thompson, the Court refused to extend its reasoning to juveniles 
older than fifteen in Stanford v. Kentucky.182  The plurality, led by Justice 
Antonin G. Scalia, was unpersuaded by new scientific evidence indicating 
adolescent brains struggle to grasp the consequences of homicidal actions.183  
Ultimately, the plurality allowed age to be considered only as a mitigating 
factor rather than as a complete bar to the death penalty for juveniles for acts 
they committed when they were older than fifteen.184   
States continued to execute juveniles older than fifteen until 2005.  In 
fact, eighteen of the twenty-two juveniles executed between 1973 and 2005 
were executed after the Stanford decision.185  The last juvenile executed in the 
United States was Scott Hain, who was executed by Oklahoma in 2003 for a 
crime he committed at age seventeen.186  The tide began to turn in 2002, when 
the United States Supreme Court ruled in Atkins v. Virginia executions of 
persons with intellectual disabilities violates the Eighth Amendment.187  The 
Court reasoned persons with intellectual disabilities have a diminished 
personal culpability because they are less able to understand and process 
information, learn from mistakes and experiences, engage in logical 
reasoning, control impulses, and understand the reactions of others.188  The 
 
 178. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).  
 179. Id. at 815.   
 180. Id. at 834.  
 181. Id. at 836–37. 
 182. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
 183. Id. at 378.  
 184. Id. at 375. 
 185. STREIB, supra note 177, at 4. 
 186. Id. at 4.   
 187. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002). 
 188. Id. at 318.  
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Court stated persons with intellectual disabilities are not exempt from criminal 
sanctions but cannot be given the death penalty.189   
In 2003, the Missouri Supreme Court applied the Court’s reasoning in 
Atkins to the execution of a seventeen-year-old in State ex rel. Simmons v. 
Roper.190  In Simmons, the Missouri Supreme Court held juveniles have a 
diminished personal culpability for all of the same reasons Atkins held those 
with intellectual disabilities are less personally culpable.191  The Missouri 
Supreme Court reasoned: (1) legislative action has consistently opposed the 
juvenile death penalty;192 (2) juries infrequently impose the death penalty for 
juveniles;193 and (3) a national and international consensus exists among 
professional, social, and religious organizations against the juvenile death 
penalty.194  
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Missouri Supreme 
Court’s application of Atkins to juveniles.195  The Court stated the death 
penalty is available only to those offenders with “extreme culpability.”196  
Importantly, for the first time, the United States Supreme Court recognized 
juveniles are fundamentally different from – and should not be classified 
among – the worst offenders for three reasons.197  First, juveniles lack maturity 
and a sense of responsibility.198  Second, juveniles are the most susceptible to 
negative influences and peer pressure.199  Third and finally, juveniles have a 
character “not as well formed as that of an adult.”200  The Court reasoned these 
fundamental differences make it impossible for judges and juries to 
consistently and accurately determine which juveniles acted with the 
appropriate culpability to receive a death sentence and which juveniles acted 
based on their youth.201   
 
 189. Id.  
 190. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397, 399 (Mo. 2003).  Notably, 
Christopher Simmons told his accomplices before they committed the murder they 
would “get away with it” because they were juveniles. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 
551, 556 (2005).  
 191. Roper, 112 S.W.3d at 399. 
 192. Id. at 407.  
 193. Id. at 409.  
 194. Id. at 410.  The Missouri Supreme Court also concluded the juvenile death 
penalty was unconstitutional “cruel and unusual” punishment barred by the Eighth 
Amendment after conducting its own independent analysis. Id. at 411.  
 195. Roper, 543 U.S. at 554. 
 196. Id. at 568.  
 197. Id. at 569.  
 198. Id.  
 199. Id. 
 200. Id.  
 201. Id. at 572–73.  “An unacceptable likelihood exists that the brutality or cold–
blooded nature of any particular crime would overpower mitigating arguments based 
on youth as a matter of course, even where the juvenile offender’s objective 
immaturity, vulnerability, and lack of truth depravity should require a sentence less 
severe than death.” Id. at 573.  
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Roper was the first time the Court recognized the scientific and social 
differences separating youth from adulthood; those same scientific and social 
differences fueled the passage of “Raise the Age” statutes just a few years 
later.202  In the decade that followed the Roper decision, the landscape for 
sentencing juvenile offenders who commit serious offenses changed 
drastically.203  The United States Supreme Court has “raised the age” of 
offenders eligible for mandatory LWOP sentences.  Today, only those aged 
eighteen and above can automatically be sentenced to LWOP for both 
homicide and non-homicide offenses.  
2.  The Cruel and Unusual Punishment of LWOP for Juvenile 
Offenders 
In Graham v. Florida,204 the Court used its reasoning from Roper to rule 
the Eighth Amendment bars a LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders who 
commit non-homicide offenses.205  The Court restated a tenet of Roper: 
juveniles have diminished culpability and are thus less deserving of the most 
severe punishments.206  Further, the Court noted defendants who do not kill, 
intend to kill, or foresee any loss of life are also categorically less deserving 
of the severest forms of punishment.207  Thus, the Court concluded juveniles 
who commit non-homicide offenses have “a twice diminished moral 
culpability.”208  This diminished culpability coupled with the acute harshness 
of a LWOP sentence for juveniles – they spend more years and a greater 
percentage of their lives in prison compared to adult offenders – prompted the 
Court to hold such mandatory LWOP sentences are “cruel and unusual” 
punishment barred by the Eighth Amendment.209  The Court conceded states 
are not required to guarantee release to all juvenile offenders convicted of 
non-homicide crimes but nonetheless must give such juvenile offenders 
“some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated 
maturity and rehabilitation.”210  In sum, after the Court’s decision in Graham, 
juveniles can no longer receive LWOP sentences for non-homicide 
 
 202. See THOMAS, supra note 151, at 19. 
 203. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (prohibiting life without 
parole for juveniles who committed non-homicide offenses); Miller v. Alabama, 567 
U.S. 460 (2012) (expanding Graham to juveniles who committed homicides); 
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016) (ruling the decision in Miller applied 
retroactively).  
 204. 560 U.S. 48 (2010).  
 205. Id. at 68.   
 206. Id.  
 207. Id. at 69. 
 208. Id.  
 209. Id. at 70–71.  
 210. Id. at 75.  
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offenses,211 and states must give juveniles with such sentences for non-
homicide offenses “meaningful opportunity” for release.212 
 Just two years later in Miller v. Alabama,213 the Court extended Graham 
to homicide cases and held mandatory LWOP sentences for offenders under 
the age of eighteen violated the Eighth Amendment.214  The Court held 
juveniles who commit criminal acts cannot automatically be given a LWOP 
sentence because they have a diminished moral culpability and “greater 
prospects for reform.”215  After this decision, before sentencing a juvenile to 
LWOP, the judge or jury must take into account the juvenile’s age.216  The 
Court stated the judge or jury must consider “hallmark features” of age such 
as “immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and 
consequences,” as well as the juvenile’s home environment, level of 
participation in the criminal conduct, the possibility of peer or familial 
pressures, and the juvenile’s ability to navigate the adult criminal justice 
system.217  Most importantly, the Court requires judges sentencing juveniles 
to consider the juvenile’s capacity for rehabilitation.218  After this decision, 
juveniles facing LWOP sentences may present their age and all associated 
mitigating evidence at their sentencing.  In 2016, the Court extended its 
holding in Miller to afford juveniles sentenced pre-Miller a re-sentencing or 
parole hearing.219 
The Court’s recent decisions reflect the same change in thinking that led 
state legislatures to create “Raise the Age” legislation.  The United States 
Supreme Court decisions discussed above conclude juveniles should be 
sentenced differently than adults for two reasons: (1) juveniles are entitled to 
more lenient sentences than adult offenders because of their incomplete brain 
development; and (2) time allows juvenile brains to develop and thus reduces 
the need for punitive intervention to accomplish reform.220  The passage of 
Missouri Senate Bill 793 indicates Missouri is joining other states and the 
United States Supreme Court in recognizing the inherent differences in 
juveniles that require they be treated differently for their acts of delinquency.  
The next Section explores Missouri Senate Bill 793 in detail by examining the 
new law’s benefit to both Missouri juveniles and Missouri communities. 
 
 211. Id. at 74–75.  
 212. Id. at 75.  
 213. 567 U.S. 460 (2012).  
 214. Id. at 470.   
 215. Id. at 471.  
 216. Id. at 477. 
 217. Id. at 477–78.  
 218. Id. at 478.  
 219. See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 736 (2016).  
 220. Susan Frelich Appleton, Deanna M. Barch & Anneliese M. Schafer, The 
Developing Brain: New Directions in Science, Policy, and Law, 57 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 1, 2 (2018) 
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IV. MISSOURI SENATE BILL 793: PROTECTING MISSOURI’S 
JUVENILES 
“Raise the Age” legislation was first introduced in the Missouri 
legislature in 2015 by Senator Wayne Wallingford.221  That year, it did not 
earn a hearing in the Senate’s Judiciary and Civil and Criminal Jurisprudence 
Committee.222  Senator Wallingford persisted and introduced the legislation 
again in 2016 and 2017.223  However, neither bill made it to a vote in that 
Committee.  Finally, in 2018, Senator Wallingford was able to send Senate 
Bill 793 to the Governor’s desk with widespread support.224  The bill passed 
the Senate by a 32-1 vote.225  The bill passed the House 139-4.226  The law 
does not go into effect until 2021 and will not be fully implemented until 2027, 
giving Missouri DYS time to hire more staff and plan to treat and house 
seventeen-year-old juveniles.  In 2021, seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders 
and Missouri’s communities will begin to reap the benefits of this legislation.   
A.  Spare the Rod, Save the Child:227 Individual Benefits of “Raise the 
Age” Legislation 
Senate Bill 793 expands the age of juvenile court jurisdiction to include 
eighteen-year-olds.228  Senate Bill 793 protects juveniles from exposure to the 
adult criminal system.  The benefits to seventeen-year-old juveniles under 
Senate Bill 793 are threefold.  First, the presumption of juvenile court 
jurisdiction exposes them to transfer laws, where they have an opportunity to 
plead their case prior to being adjudicated as an adult.  Second, juvenile courts 
shield juveniles from experiencing the vast collateral consequences that 
accompany adult convictions.  Third, juvenile courts and Missouri DYS offer 
programs and opportunities designed specifically for juvenile rehabilitation.  
This Section explores each of these benefits in turn.  
 
 221. S.B. 213, 98th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015). 
 222. SB 213 Current Bill Summary, MO. SENATE, https://www.senate.mo.gov/15i 
nfo/BTS_Web/Bill.aspx?SessionType=R&BillID=901414 [perma.cc/8Q6P-XBKW]. 
 223. See S.B. 685, 98th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2016); S.B. 40, 99th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2017).   
 224. Senate Bill 800, sponsored by Senator Doug Libla, also contained a “Raise 
the Age” provision and was signed into law on the same day Senate Bill 793 was 
signed. See S.B. 800, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (2018). 
 225. S. 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 1833 (Mo. 2018), available at 
https://www.senate.mo.gov/18info/pdf-jrnl/DAY68.pdf#page=44 [perma.cc/3HWP-
PW65].  Senator Rob Schaaf was the lone nay vote. Id.  
 226. H. 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess., at 2550 (Mo. 2018), available at 
https://house.mo.gov/billtracking/bills181/jrnpdf/jrn068.pdf#page=22 
[perma.cc/U4PC-3CV3]. 
 227. Warren, supra note 122. 
 228. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018). 
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1.  “Hear Me:” Allowing Seventeen-Year-Old Offenders to Plead 
Their Case  
First, under Senate Bill 793, seventeen-year-old juveniles accused of 
committing any felony will automatically fall under the exclusive jurisdiction 
of juvenile courts rather than being automatically processed through the adult 
system.229  However, this change does not mean juveniles cannot be tried in 
the adult criminal system.  Seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders will 
presumptively be treated as children, but after Senate Bill 793 takes full effect 
in 2021, seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders will be subjected to adult 
criminal courts only after a transfer hearing is held. 
Transfer hearings are proceedings where courts decide if children are 
treated as adults via legal fiction regardless of their actual age.230  Currently, 
any juvenile between twelve and seventeen who has committed an offense 
that would be considered a felony if committed by an adult is eligible for 
transfer to a court of general jurisdiction.231  For most eligible offenses, the 
juvenile court may order a hearing for transfer upon its own motion or a 
motion made by a juvenile officer, the child, or the child’s custodian.232  If a 
juvenile allegedly commits a “serious violent felony,” a hearing to determine 
transfer is automatically held.233   
Prior to the hearing, the court reviews a written report outlining the 
statutorily-required criteria for transfer is prepared.234  The report considers 
characteristics of the offense, including: the seriousness of the offense and 
whether transfer serves community safety; whether the alleged offense 
involves “viciousness, force, and violence;” and whether the offense was 
against persons or property.235  The report also considers the juvenile’s 
characteristics, such as: the child’s record and history, including previous 
experience with the juvenile justice system; the child’s sophistication and 
maturity as determined by consideration of their home, environmental 
situation, emotional condition, and pattern of living; the child’s age; programs 
and facilities available to the child in the juvenile system; whether the child 
can benefit from the treatment and rehabilitative programs of the juvenile 
justice system; and racial disparity in certification.236  At the transfer hearing, 
 
 229. Id.  
 230. Jenny E. Carroll, Rethinking the Constitutional Criminal Procedure of 
Juvenile Transfer Hearings: Apprendi, Adult Punishment, and Adult Process, 61 
HASTINGS L.J. 175, 176 (2009).  
 231. MO. REV. STAT. § 211.071.1 (2018). 
 232. Id.  
 233. Id.  The statute defines serious violent felony as first-degree murder, first 
degree assault, forcible rape, first degree rape, forcible sodomy, first degree sodomy, 
first degree robbery, or has committed two or more prior offenses that would be 
felonies if committed by an adult. Id.  
 234. § 211.071.6. 
 235. § 211.071.6(1)–(3). 
 236. § 211.071.6(4)–(10). 
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the judge reviews the report and hears arguments from both parties before 
deciding whether the juvenile’s case should be adjudicated in the juvenile or 
adult system.237   
Once Senate Bill 793 takes full effect, all juveniles under the age of 
eighteen will be subject to transfer laws.  This hearing also gives judges the 
chance to consider the best placement for every juvenile, whereas before 
seventeen-year-olds were barred simply by their birthdays.  These transfer 
hearings allow an opportunity for individualized justice at the front end of the 
adjudication process.  Presuming seventeen-year-old juvenile offenders are 
best rehabilitated in juvenile courts and allowing them to plead their case if 
anyone thinks otherwise is the smartest approach to addressing their 
misbehavior.  This approach exposes them to the programming of Missouri 
DYS, which is geared towards rehabilitation and skill-building rather than 
punishment and confinement.   
2.  “Help Me:” Avoiding the Collateral Consequences of a Criminal 
Conviction 
As discussed in Part III, adult prisons are dangerous places to confine 
children.  This is not the only negative consequence of juveniles being 
adjudicated in adult criminal courts.  Criminal convictions in adult courts 
often carry heavy and permanent burdens known as collateral consequences.  
Collateral consequences are “legal disabilities imposed by law as a result of a 
criminal conviction . . . .”238  These consequences deny or restrict benefits 
typically available to everyone and create social and economic barriers for 
those trying to re-enter society after a criminal conviction.239  As many as 110 
million Americans have criminal records and thus face collateral 
consequences.240  These consequences affect all areas of public life: from 
housing and employment opportunities to voting and other civic services.241  
Under the current scheme in Missouri, seventeen-year-old juveniles who are 
convicted in the adult criminal justice system face these collateral 
consequences, some of which are permanent.  Senate Bill 798 removes these 
juveniles from adult court jurisdiction absent a transfer hearing, meaning these 
children will no longer face these collateral consequences.   
 
 237. Carroll, supra note 230, at 198. 
 238. AM. BAR. ASS’N, COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF CRIMINAL CONVICTIONS: 
JUDICIAL BENCH BOOK 5 (2018). 
 239. Id.  
 240. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SURVEY OF STATE CRIMINAL HISTORY INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS, 2016, at 2 (2018). 
 241. See generally Michael Pinard & Anthony C. Thompson, Offender Reentry 
and the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions: An Introduction, 30 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 585 (2006); Gabriel J. Chin, Collateral Consequences 
and Criminal Justice: Future Policy and Constitutional Directions, 102 MARQ. L. 
REV. 233 (2018). 
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For example, landlords may deny housing to potential tenants solely 
because they have a criminal record, even if they were a juvenile when they 
committed the underlying offense.242  The federal government can deny 
people access to some social programs solely because of their criminal 
record.243  As discussed later in this Note, criminal convictions also lead to a 
substantial decrease in earning potential, as those with prior convictions 
struggle to find employment and make less money upon finding a job.244  
Overall, seventeen-year-old juveniles with prior felony convictions face a 
whole host of obstacles affecting every area of their lives that limit their ability 
to re-enter society successfully.245  Pulling children back into the juvenile 
system shields them from these detrimental and permanent consequences of 
the adult system.   
Further, persons with felony convictions are often denied the ability to 
practice their constitutional rights or engage in civic duties.  It is both a state 
and federal crime for a felon to possess a firearm, meaning those with felony 
convictions are denied their Second Amendment right to bear arms.246  Those 
with felony convictions also lose their right to vote, sometimes forever.  
Approximately six million potential voters in the United States are barred 
from voting because of a prior felony conviction.247  In Missouri, individuals 
are disqualified from voting while serving a sentence of imprisonment, while 
on probation or parole until they are discharged, and forever disqualified after 
a conviction of a felony or misdemeanor related to the right of suffrage.248  In 
2016, it was estimated this law prevented 89,665 individuals from 
 
 242. In 2016, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development released 
new guidelines under the Fair Labor Standards Act banning landlords from denying 
people housing simply because of their past criminal convictions.  Office of General 
Counsel Guidance on Application of Fair Housing Act Standards to the Use of 
Criminal Records by Providers of Housing and Real Estate-Related Transactions, 
U.S. DEP’T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVEL. at 6 (Apr. 4, 2016), 
https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/HUD_OGCGUIDAPPFHASTANDCR.PDF 
[perma.cc/RML8-2MX5].  However, the Fair Labor Standards Act has not changed to 
include this language, and landlords are still permitted to refuse housing to people who 
have been convicted of certain types of offenses. Id.  Landlords now must simply 
prove why the denial of housing serves a “substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interest.” Id. 
 243. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §862 (2018) (denying federal benefits for those with prior 
drug-related offenses).  
 244. See infra Section IV.B.1. 
 245. See generally Pinard & Thompson, supra note 241, at 613. 
 246. See MO. REV. STAT. § 571.070 (2018) (describing the elements of unlawful 
possession of a firearm); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2018) (describing the elements of the 
federal law against unlawful possession of a firearm); U.S. CONST. amend. II.  
 247. See generally, Christopher Uggen et al., 6 Million Lost Voters: State-Level 
Estimates of Felony Disenfranchisement, 2016 THE SENT’G PROJECT 3 (Oct. 6, 2016), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/6-million-lost-voters-state-level-
estimates-felony-disenfranchisement-2016/ [perma.cc/U7NN-URD4]. 
 248. MO. REV. STAT. § 115.133 (2018). 
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participating in local, state, and federal elections.249  Further, those with felony 
records cannot serve on juries.250   
In short, a felony conviction does not just result in lost time during 
incarceration but extends to affect all areas of a juvenile’s life permanently.  
Given that neuroscience has revealed juvenile brains are less able to 
appreciate the potentially serious consequences of their behavior, saddling 
juveniles with a lifetime of struggles is especially unfair.  Senate Bill 793 
shields juveniles from both the loss of time in adult incarceration and from the 
long-term negative effects collateral consequences have on their lives.  For 
Missouri’s juveniles, Missouri DYS is a better place for them to be 
rehabilitated.  
3.  “Heal Me:” Using Juvenile Programs to Rehabilitate Seventeen-
Year-Old Offenders 
As discussed in Part II, juvenile courts and juvenile treatment programs 
are aimed towards rehabilitating juveniles.251  The juvenile court system 
assumes children and their wrongdoings are often products of their 
environment.  Therefore, in order to properly treat the underlying offense, the 
child’s environment needs to improve.  Missouri DYS characterizes this idea 
as one of their “Treatment Beliefs” by stating, “All behavior has a purpose 
and is often a symptom of unmet needs.”252  Under Senate Bill 793, seventeen-
year-old juvenile offenders will be able to access Missouri DYS resources 
aimed at helping them overcome their pasts and prepare for the future. 
Juveniles entering the juvenile justice system often bring with them the 
heavy baggage of abuse, neglect, disability, and instability.  For example, in 
fiscal year 2017, forty-six percent of juveniles committed to Missouri DYS 
had a history of prior substance abuse.253  As stated in Part II.C, juveniles 
under the care of Missouri DYS often struggle with educational disabilities 
and substance abuse and require mental health services.  Unlike the Missouri 
Department of Corrections, Missouri DYS has programs and treatment 
regimens designed specifically to aid juveniles in their recovery.  Missouri 
DYS services extend to aftercare services and to the juvenile’s familial 
support system.  In 2021, seventeen-year-old juveniles who likely suffer from 
the same rate of disability will have access to Missouri DYS programming.  
Missouri DYS offers a variety of services – including individualized 
care, day treatment services, residential treatment services, education 
services, aftercare services, and family engagement programs – to help 
 
 249. Uggen et al., supra note 247, at 15. 
 250. MO. REV. STAT. § 561.026 (2018) (stating those with felony convictions are 
forever disqualified from serving on a jury).  
 251. See supra, Part II.  
 252. Missouri DYS Treatment Beliefs, MO. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., 
https://dss.mo.gov/dys/belief.htm [perma.cc/YAN2-WTFT] (last visited Dec. 19, 
2019). 
 253. 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 114, at 1.   
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juveniles overcome the struggles they face.254  Missouri DYS also undertakes 
an empirically-based risk assessment to create a “Comprehensive Individual 
Treatment Plan” for each juvenile in its care.255  These plans are flexible and 
are continuously changed as Missouri DYS develops community-based 
partnerships for education, treatment, and job placement for its juveniles.  
Missouri DYS Director Scott Odum stated that Missouri DYS will work to 
develop programming specifically geared towards seventeen-year-old 
juveniles in the years leading to 2021.256  For instance, Missouri DYS will 
develop programming to release seventeen-year-old juveniles back into 
society as adults and will place greater emphasis on developing life skills and 
vocational skills.257   
In sum, Missouri Senate Bill 793 will place seventeen-year-old juveniles 
where they belong beginning in 2021: under the jurisdiction of Missouri DYS 
where they can be given a chance at rehabilitation through programs designed 
to treat their individualized needs.  Seventeen-year-old juveniles are not the 
only group that will benefit from Missouri’s “Raise the Age” legislation.  The 
next Section outlines how Missouri Senate Bill 793 will improve 
communities.   
B.  “It Takes a Village to Raise a Child:” How Raising the Age Helps 
Communities 
This Section first discusses the benefits of Missouri’s “Raise the Age” 
legislation and then explores further reforms to improve the juvenile justice 
system in Missouri.  First, “Raise the Age” legislation is economically sound 
policy; it will save Missouri money by decreasing recidivism rates and will 
increase Missouri’s tax revenue in the long run.  Second, early intervention 
aimed at preventing children from entering the adult criminal justice system 
means lower crime rates and safer communities. 
1.  “You Got to Spend Money to Make Money:” The Economic 
Payout of “Raise the Age” Legislation  
Senate Bill 793 will decrease costs in Missouri by diverting seventeen-
year-old juveniles to Missouri DYS, where recidivism rates are much lower 
than the Missouri Department of Corrections.  Missouri Senate Bill 793 will 
also improve the economic outlook for the seventeen-year-old juveniles 
 
 254. Division of Youth Services, MO. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/ 
[perma.cc/66TH-BC7F] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). 
 255. Individualized Care, MO. DEP’T SOC. SERVS., https://dss.mo.gov/dys/individ 
ualized-care.htm [perma.cc/V7GG-67GW] (last visited Dec. 19, 2019). 
 256. Telephone Interview with Scott Odum, Director, Missouri Division of Youth 
Servs. (Sept. 14, 2018) (Please note at the time of this interview, Mr. Odum was 
Deputy Director of Missouri DYS and was named Director during the drafting of this 
paper).  
 257. Id.  
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affected and thus will improve the economic power of the state.258  The next 
Section outlines these economic benefits by examining cost-savings from 
reduced recidivism and, in turn, the increase in spending power for seventeen-
year-old juveniles as a result of this bill.  
First, Missouri DYS will likely see an increase in expenditures in the 
immediate years following Missouri Senate Bill 793’s implementation in 
2021.  This is largely due to the increase in juveniles falling under Missouri 
DYS’s care.  In the fiscal note attached to Senate Bill 793, Missouri DYS 
estimated approximately 284 juveniles will be transferred from the Missouri 
Department of Corrections to Missouri DYS as a result of this bill.259  
Missouri DYS estimates a fiscal impact of $1.8 million to develop 
programming aimed at seventeen-year-old juveniles and to hire and train 
additional staff.260  On the other hand, the Missouri Department of Corrections 
expects to see a reduction in costs due to fewer offenders being housed in its 
facilities.  In 2018, the Missouri Department of Corrections expected to reduce 
the prison population by 425 offenders in the year 2021.261  After ten years, 
the Missouri Department of Corrections expects to see 1310 less offenders in 
its prisons and expects to save $3.8 million as a result of Senate Bill 793.262   
Further, to offset the increase in cost for the juvenile system, Senate Bill 
793 creates the Juvenile Justice Preservation Fund, which will expire in fiscal 
year 2025.263  This fund will generate revenue from two new surcharges added 
to some judicial actions.  First, a $2 surcharge will be added to all county and 
state traffic violations where the offender pleads guilty.264  This surcharge is 
expected to raise between $1.05 million and $1.26 million.265  Second, a $3.50 
surcharge will be collected for every civil action filed in the state.266  The 
Office of the State Courts Administrator expects this to generate $840,706 and 
$1,008,847, respectively, for the Fund.267 
 
 258. See generally, DAVID M. MITCHELL, ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
RAISE THE AGE LEGISLATION IN MISSOURI 1 (Nov. 2017) (note his estimates are based 
upon the fiscal note compiled for Missouri Senate Bill 40, which is the “Raise the 
Age” legislation introduced in 2017 and is substantially similar to Missouri Senate 
Bill 793). 
 259. COMMITTEE ON LEGIS. RES. OVERSIGHT DIV., FISCAL NOTE (June 8, 2018), 
https://www.senate.mo.gov/18info/BTS_FiscalNotes/index.aspx?SessionType=R&B
illID=69675271 [perma.cc/X2AH-9XHL] [hereinafter FISCAL NOTE] (discussing the 
financial impact of Senate Bill 793).  
 260. Id.  
 261. Id.  
 262. Id.  
 263. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) (modifying MO. REV. 
STAT. § 211.435).  
 264. Id.  
 265. FISCAL NOTE, supra note 259. 
 266. S.B. 793, 99th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2018) (modifying MO. REV. 
STAT. § 488.315). 
 267. FISCAL NOTE, supra note 259. 
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The legislation is also likely to result in higher tax revenue because 
people without criminal records and periods of incarceration generally earn 
more income and thus pay more taxes.  For example, a study on Missouri’s 
“Raise the Age” legislation compared the income and taxes paid of an average 
citizen without a period of incarceration (“Mr. Citizen”) to the income and 
taxes paid of a citizen who had been incarcerated for ten years (“Mr. 
Criminal”).268  Mr. Criminal’s criminal action cost society approximately 
$814,436 over Mr. Criminal’s lifetime when compared to the income earned 
and taxes paid by Mr. Citizen.269 
Senate Bill 793 ensures Missouri’s seventeen-year-old juveniles do not 
face this same loss of earnings.  In 2017, there were 430 seventeen-year-old 
juveniles serving time in Missouri Department of Corrections facilities.270  On 
average, those juveniles will be 23.2 years old when they are first eligible for 
release.271  Because of their youth upon entering Missouri Department of 
Corrections, they are unlikely to have any significant work experience upon 
their release at age 23.  Facing the same constraints as Mr. Criminal above, 
those 306 juveniles will earn a collective $305.6 million in wages and pay 
$62.3 million in taxes.272  
On the other hand, if those juveniles fell under the jurisdiction of 
Missouri DYS, the state would raise approximately $52 million more in taxes 
over the seventeen-year-old juveniles’ lifetimes than if they were incarcerated 
in adult prisons.273  They are unlikely to earn wages equal to an adult who has 
never committed an act of delinquency (Mr. Citizen), but they earn 
significantly more than their counterparts incarcerated in the adult system 
(Mr. Criminal).274  Under this assumption, juveniles whose delinquency is 
addressed by Missouri DYS are likely to earn approximately $504 million in 
lifetime income and pay $114.2 million in lifetime taxes.275 
 
 268. MITCHELL, supra note 258, at 7–11.  Mr. Citizen’s career begins when he is 
eighteen and spans for forty-seven years, and he earns $2.4 million in income and pays 
a total of $741,622 in various taxes. Id. at 8.  Mr. Criminal also begins work at age 
eighteen but commits a crime when he is twenty-one and receives a ten-year sentence.  
Id. at 9.  When Mr. Criminal is released from jail, he begins to seek employment. Id.  
However, his earning potential will remain below Mr. Citizen’s for the rest of his life 
for two reasons: first, his felony conviction makes it harder for him to find 
employment; and second, because of his felony conviction, he will suffer from a 
permanent decrease in wages. Id.  Over his lifetime, Mr. Criminal earns $812,421 in 
income and pays $167,032 in taxes.  Id. at 10. 
 269. Id. at 10.  
 270. Id. at 13.  Of these prisoners, two were serving life sentences without the 
possibility of parole, and the remainder had an average sentence of 7.3 years. Id. 
 271. Id. at 15.  Those juveniles convicted of murder, rape, sexual assault, robbery, 
and manslaughter were excluded from this calculation.  Id. at 15 n.9. 
 272. Id. at 15.  
 273. Id. at 16.  
 274. Id. at 15–16.  
 275. Id. at 16. 
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In sum, the increase in departmental expenses can be viewed as 
immediate cost-shifting and over time cost-saving as Missouri DYS gains 
jurisdiction over juveniles the Missouri Department of Corrections loses.  
Further, any initial increase in costs due to the increased expense of housing 
juveniles in Missouri DYS facilities will likely decrease costs in the future, as 
juveniles in residential facilities typically spend less time there than they 
would in adult prisons and are less likely to recidivate and enter the adult 
system later in their lives.  
2.  Children Are Our Future: Further Community Reforms to Give 
Today’s Children a Chance 
The next Section attempts to put “Raise the Age” legislation in context 
by outlining some of the other problems facing Missouri juveniles today.  The 
benefits of Senate Bill 793 should be coupled with reforms to both prevent 
children from coming in contact with the juvenile court system and to improve 
the system for those juveniles who must face adjudication.  Improving access 
to education, minimizing the effects of racial disparities, and improving 
access to competent and prepared attorneys will ultimately improve outcomes 
of affected juveniles.  This Section concludes there is still more work to be 
done in the Missouri juvenile justice system to improve the futures of 
Missouri’s juveniles. 
First, further reforms can be aimed at preventing children from entering 
the juvenile justice system in the first place.  Meeting children’s educational 
needs could be a first step in preventing any future acts of delinquency.  A 
2005 study found the national average for juveniles with educational 
disabilities who are confined in correctional facilities was thirty-three 
percent.276  These children were more likely to come into contact with the 
juvenile justice system as a result of school zero-tolerance policies for certain 
behavior that results in immediate suspension or expulsion.277  Zero-tolerance 
policies in schools often punish behavior that is a manifestation of an 
educational disability; this makes it more likely for students with educational 
disabilities to come into contact with the juvenile justice system.278  
Missouri’s criminal code does not adequately address this problem.279  
Recently, Missouri enacted a new criminal code that may negatively impact 
students in Missouri schools by criminalizing behavior previously outside the 
reach of juvenile courts.280  While zero-tolerance policies create easy-to-
follow, bright line rules for schools, they remove teacher and administrator 
 
 276. Lisa M. Geis, An IEP for the Juvenile Justice System: Incorporating Special 
Education Law Throughout the Delinquency Process, 44 U. MEM. L. REV. 869, 873 
(2014). 
 277. Id. at 879.  
 278. Id.  
 279. Michele L. Moyer, Note, Schoolyard Felons: Missouri’s New Criminal Code 
and Its Impact on Schools, 82 MO. L. REV. 1213, 1227 (2017). 
 280. Id. at 1213–14.   
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discretion in addressing student misconduct.  Further, Missouri’s education 
system has been criticized for failing to keep up with national academic 
benchmarks.281  Missouri should consider educational reforms that improve 
Missouri students’ academic performance and reduce the “school-to-prison 
pipeline.”282  Such reforms could result in less contact with the juvenile justice 
system for vulnerable children, thus reducing costs and improving individual 
outcomes.   
Missouri could also raise the age at which children are eligible for 
transfer to the adult criminal justice system.  Currently, Missouri allows 
children as young as twelve to be transferred and tried in the adult criminal 
system.  Only two other states – Colorado and Vermont – allow transfer of 
children age twelve to adult courts, and only two states – Wisconsin and Iowa 
– allow children as young as ten to be transferred to adult courts.283  Most 
states set the minimum age of transfer at fourteen.284  By passing Missouri 
Senate Bill 793, the state acknowledged juveniles as old as seventeen are not 
presumptively fit for the adult criminal justice system.  Therefore, it seems 
inconsistent to continue to subject juveniles as young as twelve to the adult 
criminal system at all.  Limiting the number of paths to adult court and 
creating reasonable age restrictions for transfer to adult courts is consistent 
with the “Raise the Age” movement.  Further, such restrictions will protect 
Missouri juveniles from the harshness of the adult criminal justice system. 
Next, Missouri should make changes to prevent systemic bias and 
injustice in the juvenile system.  For example, juveniles in Missouri are often 
subjected to racial discrimination within the juvenile justice system.285  Race 
 
 281. Mae C. Quinn, The Other “Missouri Model”: Systemic Juvenile Injustice in 
the Show-Me State, 70 MO. L. REV. 1193, 1203 (2013) (stating a Center on Education 
Policy study found Missouri ranked forty-ninth out of fifty in the 2010–2011 school 
year for satisfying the educational standards of the No Child Left Behind Act); see 
also Valerie Strauss, The Sad Story of Public Education in St. Louis, WASH. POST 
(Sept. 7, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/answer-
sheet/wp/2017/09/07/the-sad-story-of-public-education-in-st-
louis/?utm_term=.9f6d172fd12a [perma.cc/VJ72-3WAX]. 
 282. See generally Kendra Cheek & Justin Bucchio, School-to-Prison Pipeline 
Can Be Dismantled Using Alternative Discipline Strategies, JUVENILE JUSTICE INFO. 
EXCH. (Sept. 7, 2017), https://jjie.org/2017/09/07/alternative-discipline-strategies-for-
dismantling-the-school-to-prison-pipeline/ [perma.cc/J9B9-EBHS]; S. David 
Mitchell, Zero Tolerance Policies: Criminalizing Childhood and Disenfranchising the 
Next Generation of Citizens, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 271 (2014).   
 283. UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFF. OF JUV. JUST. AND DELINQUENCY 
PREVENTION STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, MINIMUM TRANSFER AGE SPECIFIED IN 
STATUTE (2015), available at https://www.ojjdp.gov/ojstatbb/structure_process/qa04 
105.asp [perma.cc/U4EP-QJRN].  Wisconsin has charged a ten-year old girl with 
homicide in adult court. See Four Keys Issues in Murder Case of 10-Year-Old Suspect, 
ASS’N PRESS (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.columbiatribune.com/zz/news/20181109/4-
key-issues-in-murder-case-of-10-year-old-suspect [perma.cc/QX7F-DT2Y].   
 284. MINIMUM TRANSFER AGE SPECIFIED IN STATUTE, supra note 283.  
 285. See INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS, 
MISSOURI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 3 (2015). 
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shares a strong correlation to other structural inequalities such as poverty, 
social disadvantage, lack of neighborhood organization, and lack of access to 
upward mobility.  These factors mean Missouri’s most vulnerable juveniles 
are the ones most likely to face its juvenile justice system.286  In 2015, the 
United States Justice Department found “[b]lack children are subjected to 
harsher treatment because of their race” in the St. Louis County Family 
Court.287  The study also found black children are more likely to experience 
formal adjudication, get pretrial detention, and be committed to Missouri DYS 
upon violation of the conditions equivalent to probation or parole than 
similarly-situated white children.288  This racial disparity means the due 
process rights of black juveniles are systematically violated, and Missouri 
DYS is receiving children that could be successfully diverted to less restrictive 
treatment plans.  Reforms aimed at removing racial disparities from the 
juvenile justice system would ensure all children receive the best treatment.289   
Further, Missouri’s juveniles are systematically denied access to 
adequate counsel.290  For example, the same Justice Department study that 
found racial discrimination in the St. Louis County Family Court also found 
only one public defender was designated to represent all children in the 
court.291  In 2014, that St. Louis County public defender handled 394 juvenile 
cases.292  Further, in 2012, 4631 new juvenile delinquency and status offense 
petitions were reported to the Missouri Supreme Court, but Missouri State 
Public Defenders were assigned to only 1923 juvenile cases.293  
Approximately sixty-percent of juveniles were left without access to 
counsel.294  For those who received assistance from a public defender, that 
 
 286. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, REFORMING JUVENILE JUSTICE: A DEVELOPMENTAL 
APPROACH 6–7 (Richard J. Bonnie et al. eds., 2013). 
 287. INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS, supra 
note 285, at 3.  
 288. Id. at 3–4. 
 289. See Racial Disparities Remain but St. Louis County Family Court Claims 




 290. See INVESTIGATION OF THE ST. LOUIS COUNTY FAMILY COURT ST. LOUIS, 
MISSOURI, supra note 285, at 8.  Missouri’s indigent public defense system has faced 
astronomical challenges for years related to limited resources and constant budget 
shortcomings. Id. at 3. 
 291. Richard Pérez-Peña, St. Louis County Biased Against Black Juveniles, Justice 
Department Finds, THE N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2015) 
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/01/us/st-louis-county-biased-against-black-
juveniles-justice-department-finds.html [perma.cc/9UQ2-KVLN]. 
 292. Id.  
 293. MARY ANN SCALI ET AL., NAT’L JUV. JUST. DEFENDER CTR., MISSOURI: 
JUSTICE RATIONED 34–35 (2013). 
 294. Id. at 35.  
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public defender only had time to devote 4.6 hours to their case.295  An 
underfunded public defense system negatively impacts juveniles in a special 
way: juveniles already have a diminished capacity to understand the 
consequences of their actions by virtue of their age, and thus without 
representation, struggle to understand the intricacies of the system they face.  
Adequately funding the Missouri State Public Defender would ensure children 
facing the daunting juvenile system have the legal assistance they need to 
successfully navigate the system.296 
“Raise the Age” legislation is a smart move for Missouri’s juveniles, but 
the system is not perfect.  Further reforms can ensure fewer children are 
subjected to a juvenile court and are treated fairly if they do find themselves 
in a juvenile court.  Guaranteeing equal access to education, raising the 
minimum age at which a child can be tried as an adult, minimizing the effect 
race plays in the juvenile justice system, and providing children access to 
adequate counsel will all ensure fewer children end up in juvenile courts 
across the state and receive better outcomes when they do.  
V. CONCLUSION 
The “Raise the Age” movement represents the United States’ changing 
attitude in addressing juvenile delinquency.  The movement indicates the 
United States has come far from treating children as miniature adults.  Since 
neuroscience uncovered the developmental arc of adolescent brains, 
legislatures and judiciaries across the nation have participated in the “Raise 
the Age” movement by working to incorporate the changing understanding of 
juvenile delinquency into the legal system of the United States.   
Missouri has long been a leader in the area of juvenile justice reform.  
The creation of Missouri DYS was a revolution in the late twentieth century.  
However, the success of Missouri’s juvenile system in rehabilitating children 
has been overshadowed by cases like Julian Mathews.  Because of an outdated 
law premised on a misunderstanding of juvenile delinquency, Julian Mathews 
may be burdened with adult consequences for childish actions.  Missouri 
Senate Bill 793 changes that for future children.  The new law also benefits 
communities where children like Julian live through long-term cost savings 
and by lowering crime rates.  Overall, Senate Bill 793 reflects a juvenile 
system that is ultimately concerned with the well-being and safety of every 
child and recognizes we are all better when our children are happier, healthier, 
and safer.   
 
 295. AM. BAR ASSOC., THE MISSOURI PROJECT: A STUDY OF THE MISSOURI PUBLIC 
DEFENDER SYSTEM AND ATTORNEY WORKLOAD STANDARDS 15 (2014), available at 
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/legal_aid_indigent_defendants
/2014/ls_sclaid_5c_the_missouri_project_report.authcheckdam.pdf [perma.cc/QNJ9-
JJTV].  Public defenders should be averaging 19.5 hours per juvenile case. Id. at 6. 
 296. See generally id.; Taylor Payne, Note, Plight of the Public Defender: 
Excessive Caseload as a Non-Mitigating Factor in Sanctions for Ethical Violations, 
83 MO. L. REV. 1087 (2018). 
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